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Admiralty
by Colin A. McRae*
and Jessica L. McClellan**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals were busy in 2007 with admiralty cases and other matters of
importance to maritime practitioners. The Supreme Court considered
two punitive damages cases with maritime implications and reviewed a
case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' with potential bearing
on Jones Act2 jurisprudence. The Supreme Court also clarified an
important procedural issue concerning the application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, which often arises in maritime cases. The Eleventh
Circuit continued its trend of tackling important maritime questions by
issuing opinions on (1) the interplay between the Seaman's Wage Act 3
and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards,4 (2) the recoverability of punitive damages in Jones
Act cases, and (3) the burden of proof in allision cases.

*
Partner in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
Yale University (B.A., 1995); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude, 1999). Member,
Savannah and American Bar Associations; State Bar of Georgia; Maritime Law Association
of the United States; Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute.
** Associate in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 2000, Phi Beta Kappa; J.D., cum laude,
2003). Member, Savannah and American Bar Associations (Chair, Admiralty and Maritime
Committee of the Tort and Insurance Practice Section, 2007-2008); State Bar of Georgia;
Maritime Law Association of the United States; Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute.
1. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000).
3. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2000).
4. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Punitive Damages and Due Process

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer5 involved the contamination of property
owned by the Grefers and leased to an oil and oil pipe company.' Exxon
was among the defendants sued by the Grefers for damages after they
discovered radium on their land. The plaintiffs sued under theories of
negligence, strict liability, absolute liability, nuisance, and fraud and
sought compensatory and punitive damages for loss of use and remediation of the property. The case was initiated in 1997 in civil trial court
in Louisiana and was subsequently amended and affirmed on appeal. v
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
The Grefers leased their thirty-three-acre property to a company
known as Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. ("ITCO"), who cleaned oil
pipelines for Exxon. The property owners learned after the end of the
lease that the land was contaminated with radium and sued ITCO,
Exxon's main cleaning contractor, and Exxon, among others. At trial,
the district court in Orleans Parish awarded the Grefers over $56 million
in compensatory damages and $1 billion in punitive damages, to be paid
by Exxon, for the harm done to their property.9
Exxon and the Grefers appealed.1 ° The Louisiana Court of Appeal
for the Fourth Circuit reduced the punitive damages award to twice the
compensatory damage amount to comply with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 1 but otherwise the court of appeal
affirmed the lower court's holding. 2 Exxon filed many assignments
of
3
error on appeal, but only the lack of due process claim succeeded.1
The appellate court rejected Exxon's argument that the $56 million in
restoration damages was unreasonable, deferring to the trier of fact for
the determination of damages, despite the fact that the tract of land was
valued at $1.5 million. 4 The appellate court upheld the restoration

5. 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007).
6. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1123 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
7. Id. at 1127-28.
8. Grefer, 127 S. Ct. at 1371.
9. Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1127-28.
10. Id. at 1129.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Grefer, 901 So. 2d at 1142, 1152. The compensatory damage award was
$56,145,000, so the punitive damage award was reduced from $1,000,000,000 to
$112,290,000. Id. at 1152.
13. Id. at 1129, 1154.
14. Id. at 1141.
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damages. 5 The court then cited evidence of the defendants' wanton or
reckless conduct, such as the continued health and environmental
hazards they caused between 1985 and 1992 and their failure to warn
the public or make efforts to remedy the hazards.16 Although the
appellate court was willing to uphold an award for punitive damages, it
held that the amount of the award, $1 billion, was unconstitutional
because it was exceedingly disproportionate to the $56 million compensatory award. 7 The appellate court concluded that a lesser, single-digit
ratio between the compensatory and punitive awards would be appropriate and decreased the punitive award to $112,290,000.18
Exxon appealed the appellate court's decision to the United States
Supreme Court.19 The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and vacated the judgment of the Louisiana Court of Appeal and
remanded it for consideration in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams.'°

B. Punitive Damages and Harm to Nonparties
The question of whose injury may be assessed in determining punitive
damage awards was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams.2 This case arose when the representative of Jesse Williams's estate brought suit for negligence and deceit
against the manufacturer of cigarettes the decedent smoked. The estate
claimed the manufacturer downplayed the reality of the dangers of
smoking and thus contributed to the decedent's death."
The jury awarded the Williams family $821,000 in compensatory
damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages to be paid by Philip
Morris. The trial court reduced the large award of punitive damages,
but the state appellate court reinstated the jury's verdict. The Oregon
Supreme Court upheld the punitive damage award, which was partially
based on harm to nonparties to the litigation. The United States
Supreme Court granted Philip Morris' petition for certiorari to address
its contention that the punitive damage award was grossly excessive and
impermissibly included a consideration of harm to nonparties."

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1145-47.
Id. at 1149-50, 1152.
Id.
Grefer, 127 S. Ct. at 1371.
Id.; 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061-62.
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The United States Supreme Court held that although harm to
nonparties could be considered in assessing the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct for purposes of punitive damages, the punitive
award cannot be based on the jury's desire to punish the defendant for
harming people not parties to the litigation at hand.24 The Court held
that such an award was a taking of property without due process
because a defendant would not be able
to adequately defend itself
25
against a claim of injury to a nonparty.
The Court in Philip Morris did not address the allegation that the
award was grossly excessive and instead vacated the punitive damage
judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration based on due
process considerations.2" The Court concluded that punitive damage
awards cannot be used to punish a defendant for harming nonparties
because too much would be left to jury speculation.27 Potential harm
can only be considered when it is potential harm to the plaintiff.28 If
a court permits a jury to consider harm to others, it cannot uphold a
punitive damage award based solely on that premise. 29 The case was
remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court to apply the correct constitutional standard, which may lead to either a new trial or a reduction of
damages.3"
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the harm to nonparties is
a relevant factor in assessing reprehensibility in civil court punitive
damage awards.3 ' Justice Stevens classified punitive damages as "a
sanction for the public harm the defendant's conduct has caused or
threatened."3 2
C. Standardof Causation Under the FederalEmployers' Liability
Act
The Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA) 33 is a statutory
scheme governing railroads' liability to their employees for injuries

24. Id. at 1065.
25.

Id. at 1060, 1063.

26. Id. at 1065.
27. Id. at 1063.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1064.
30. Id. at 1065.
31. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. In an interesting alignment of forces, Justices Thomas and Scalia joined Justice
Ginsburg in dissent. Id. at 1067 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented
separately. Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
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resulting in whole or in part from the railroad's negligence.34 An
employee's contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery under FELA,
but the employee's recovery is reduced in proportion to his or her
contributory negligence. 35 In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell,3" Timothy Sorrell sued his employer, Norfolk Southern Railway
Co., in Missouri state court under FELA. Sorrell sustained neck and
back injuries while working as a trackman when his dump truck veered
off the road and tipped over. The cause of the accident was disputed,
and Sorrell claimed it was due to the employer railroad company's negligence. Sorrell's employer responded that Sorrell's own negligence caused
the accident and resulting injuries.3 7
Missouri's jury instructions for FELA liability call for one standard of
causation to be applied to employer negligence and another to employee
contributory negligence.38 The instructions provide that a jury must
"find an employee contributorily negligent if the employee was negligent
and his negligence 'directly contributed to cause' the injury."39 On the
other hand, per these instructions, railroad negligence will be found "if
the railroad was negligent and its negligence contributed 'in whole or in
part' to the injury."40 The Missouri state court instructed the jury
according to these standards, over the employer's objection, and the jury
found for Sorrell, awarding $1.5 million in damages. The Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed, and the Missouri Supreme
41
Court denied discretionary review.
The United States Supreme Court granted the railroad's petition for
certiorari and vacated the judgment awarding $1.5 million to Sorrell.42
The railroad's primary argument on appeal was the variation in
standards for contributory negligence of the employee as opposed to
negligence of the employer. In arguing for a single standard, Norfolk
Southern pointed out that Missouri is the only state that advocates this
divergent standard, and at common law, the causation standards for
negligence and contributory negligence are the same. 43 The Supreme
Court gave great weight to the common law in its analysis and found "no

34.
35.
36.
to the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. § 53.
127 S. Ct. 799 (2007). This case is reviewed in this Article on Admiralty law due
historical similarity between FELA and the Jones Act.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id. at 803, 809.
Id. at 803, 805-06.
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basis for concluding that Congress in FELA meant to allow disparate
causation standards."4 4
Sorrell argued that even if the instructions improperly contained
different causation standards, the error was harmless and the verdict
should be upheld.45 The United States Supreme Court refused to make
Court of Appeals to
this decision and remanded the case to the Missouri
46
decide whether a new trial would be necessary.
D.

Threshold Jurisdictionand Forum Non Conveniens

In Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping
Corp.,4" the United States Supreme Court addressed a jurisdictional
question to resolve a split among the circuits. A Pennsylvania district
court dismissed a case on forum non conveniens grounds without first
addressing potential subject matter or personal jurisdiction objections,
and Malaysia International, the original plaintiff, challenged the
permissibility of the dismissal. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a district court must first
determine that it has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to
entertain a case before it can grant a dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds.4" The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the issue.49
Sinochem International Co. ("Sinochem") was a Chinese importer who
arranged to purchase steel coils from a United States manufacturer.
The manufacturer arranged for a vessel owned by Malaysia International to transport the coils from Philadelphia to China. Once in China, a
bill of lading triggered immediate payment. Sinochem then petitioned
a Chinese admiralty court to arrest the vessel, claiming that Malaysia
International had falsely backdated the bill of lading.50
When Sinochem's complaint was dismissed in a Chinese court,
Malaysia International initiated this Pennsylvania suit against
Sinochem for Sinochem's misrepresentations and the damages that arose
from the ship's arrest in China. Sinochem moved to dismiss on multiple
grounds, including lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the
suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the underlying

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 806.
Id. at 809.
Id.
127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id. at 1188.
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controversy concerned alleged misrepresentations by a Chinese
corporation to a Chinese admiralty court resulting in the arrest of a
Malaysian ship in China. In turn, the Third Circuit reversed the
dismissal, holding that the case could not be dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds until the court deciding the case had both personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant.5 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the
appellate court, thus reinstating the district court's holding that
permitted the dismissal of a suit on forum non conveniens grounds when
considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy warrant
dismissal prior to addressing any jurisdictional issues." The Court
limited to its particular facts the holding of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,53
which held that the forum non conveniens doctrine does not apply if
there is an absence ofjurisdiction (in other words, when the jurisdictional question has been addressed and the court in which the case is
brought is definitively without jurisdiction), and the Court refused to
extend that holding to Sinochem.5 4
The Supreme Court stated that Sinochem is a "textbook case for
immediate forum non conveniens dismissal ... [and d]iscovery concerning personal jurisdiction would have burdened Sinochem with expense
and delay."55 In reversing and remanding to the lower court, the
Supreme Court concluded that the lower court need not resolve whether
it has the authority to adjudicate the action if it determines that a
foreign tribunal is plainly a more suitable forum.5"
III.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES

A. Interaction Between the Seaman's Wage Act and the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
In Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the question of whether the Seaman's Wage Act,5" which gives seamen
the right to access federal courts in order to resolve wage disputes,
supersedes the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of

51. Id. at 1189.
52. Id. at 1192.
53. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
54. Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1193 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 504).
55. Id. at 1194.
56. Id.
57. 488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007).
58. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2000).
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Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention").5 9 In Lobo a cruise ship
employee sued his employer, Celebrity Cruises, Inc., claiming that he
was forced to pay part of his earnings to his assistants, contrary to his
collective bargaining agreement with Celebrity Cruises. He further
argued that the arbitration clause in his collective bargaining agreement
violated the Seaman's Wage Act.6"
Inacio Lobo was paired with an assistant to clean each passenger
cabin, and he was required to pay that assistant $1.20 per passenger per
day from his gratuities. Lobo sued Celebrity Cruises in federal court
under the Seaman's Wage Act, claiming that under his collective
bargaining agreement, passenger gratuities are included as part of his
pay as a stateroom attendant. 1
Celebrity Cruises moved to dismiss Lobo's claims, arguing that the
case did not belong in federal court because the Convention compelled
enforcement of the employees' collective bargaining agreement, which
required arbitration. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida agreed and dismissed Lobo's claim against his
employer.6 2 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal and held that the Convention required enforcement of
the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause.6
Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lobo's
reliance on U.S. Bulk Carriers,Inc. v. Arguelles64 was misplaced. 65 In
Lobo the United States Supreme Court interpreted Arguelles as holding
that the Seaman's Wage Act supersedes the Labor Management
Relations Act,66 which "'provides a federal remedy to enforce grievance
and arbitration provisions of collective-bargaining agreements'" in
commercial contracts.67 Therefore, Lobo argued that the Seaman's
Wage Act should supersede the Convention, and he should therefore be
entitled to sue in federal court rather than submit to arbitration.Y The
Eleventh Circuit held that Lobo's reliance on Arguelles was mislaid
because both the briefing and the oral argument in Arguelles occurred
prior to the implementation of the Convention; 69 therefore, the Supreme

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
Lobo, 488 F.3d at 893.
Id.
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 896.
400 U.S. 351 (1971).
Lobo, 488 F.3d at 894.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
Lobo, 488 F.3d at 894 (quoting Arguelles, 400 U.S. at 352).
Id. at 894.
Id. The Convention was implemented on December 29, 1970. Id.
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Court in Arguelles did not address the relationship between the
Seaman's Wage Act and the Convention.7 ° In Lobo the Eleventh
Circuit refused "'to read industry-specific exceptions into the broad
language of the Convention Act"' and concluded that the Convention
obligated the United States to abide by the international treaty
requiring states to recognize and enforce international arbitration
agreements. 7'
B.

Jones Act and Punitive Damages

The Eleventh Circuit examined whether punitive damages may be
recovered in maintenance and cure actions in Atlantic Sounding Co. v.
Townsend.72 Townsend, a seaman and crew member of the Motor Tug
Thomas, allegedly slipped and landed shoulder first on the steel deck of
the vessel, injuring his shoulder and clavicle. Townsend alleged that his
employer, Atlantic Sounding, advised him that it would not provide
maintenance and cure." Atlantic Sounding filed suit for declaratory
relief on the question of its obligations. Two days later, Townsend filed
a separate suit against Atlantic Sounding under the Jones Act 74 and
general maritime law, alleging negligence, unseaworthiness, arbitrary
and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, and wrongful termination. He then filed the same claims as counterclaims to the declaratory
judgment action and sought punitive damages on his maintenance and
cure claim.75
The district court consolidated the two actions, and Atlantic Sounding
moved to strike or to dismiss Townsend's request for punitive damages.
Atlantic Sounding contended that under the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,7 neither the Jones Act
nor general maritime law provided a cause of action against an employer
for nonpecuniary damages. The district court denied Atlantic Sounding's
motion, concluding that it was bound by the Eleventh Circuit's prior
ruling in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc.,7" which permitted the award of
punitive damages. Interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was then
granted.7"

70.
71.
72.
73.
wages
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 895.
Id. (quoting Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005)).
496 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1283. Maintenance and cure covers medical care, a living allowance, and
for seamen who become ill or are injured while serving aboard a vessel. Id.
46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000).
Atl. Sounding Co., 496 F.3d at 1283-84.
498 U.S. 19 (1990).
820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987).
AtI. Sounding Co., 496 F.3d at 1283-84.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit examined whether it could depart
from its prior ruling in Hines, based on the Supreme Court's intervening
decision in Miles.79 The Eleventh Circuit first discussed the "prior
panel precedent rule," which provides that "a later panel may depart
from an earlier panel's decision only when the intervening Supreme
Court decision is 'clearly on point. '"' ° In Hines a panel of the Eleventh
Circuit had "determined that, in an action for maintenance and cure,
'both reasonable attorney's fees and punitive damages may be legally
awarded in a proper case'-that is, upon a showing of a shipowner's
willful and arbitrary refusal to pay maintenance and cure."81 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "in Miles, the Supreme Court 'conclude[d]
that there is no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action
for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman."'82
Atlantic Sounding argued that the uniformity principle in Miles
"dictates that all subsequent courts determining the availability of
damages in a maritime case must provide for uniform results in similar
factual settings, regardless of whether the action is brought pursuant to
the Jones Act, [the Death on the High Seas Act] or general maritime
law." 3 Atlantic Sounding reasoned that, under this principle, Townsend could not recover punitive damages for a maintenance and cure
cause of action "because he would not be able to recover punitive damages-which are non-pecuniary in nature-under the Jones Act."8 4 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that Atlantic Sounding's argument could
"only be based on the reasoning of the Miles opinion, not on the Miles
decision: its holding. Miles says and-more important--decides nothing
about maintenance and cure actions or punitive damages." 5 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that Miles provided no basis to depart
from Hines under the prior panel precedent rule and affirmed the lower
court's denial of Atlantic Sounding's motion to strike Townsend's request
for punitive damages.86

79.
80.
(11th
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1284.
(quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292
2003)).
(quoting Hines, 820 F.2d at 1189).
at 1285 (emphasis added) (brackets in original) (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 33).
(internal quotation marks omitted).
at 1285-86.
at 1286.

2008]

ADMIRALTY

1073

C. Burden of Proofin Allision Cases
In Fischer v. SlY Neraida,7 the Eleventh Circuit clarified several
somewhat murky questions concerning the burden of proof in allision
cases. The Neraida was a sailing yacht anchored in Lake Worth in 2004
when Tropical Storm Frances approached, gained steam, and eventually
made landfall as Hurricane Frances. The owner of Neraida dispatched
the yacht's caretaker, Gregory Afthinos, and a companion, Steven
Cienkowski, to prepare the yacht for the approaching storm. Over the
course of thirty minutes of preparation time, Cienkowski s8 tied and
secured the Neraida's sails to the masts 9 and dropped the yacht's selfsetting, secondary anchor.9"
After sustaining gusts of hurricane-force winds for six to eight hours,
the Neraida lost several sails and was set adrift, eventually coming to
rest against a dock owned by David Fischer. Mr. Fischer brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
against the yacht and its owner, Neraida Co., LP, claiming that his dock
had sustained damages from the impact of the yacht as a result of a
negligent failure to secure the yacht prior to the hurricane.9 The trial
consisted mainly of expert testimony on the reasonableness of the prehurricane preparations. The district court found that the measures used
to secure the vessel were in fact reasonable, and therefore, under 46
U.S.C.A. § 30505,92
the vessel and its owner were entitled to exonera93
tion from liability.

On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Fischer argued that the trial court
had applied an improper burden of proof and committed clear error in
deciding that the preparations were reasonable.94 As support for its
first contention, Fischer pointed to language in a "single ambiguous
sentence" of the trial court's conclusions of law: "'[b]ecause Plaintiffs
have failed to prove that Defendants were negligent in their hurricane
preparations with regard to the S/Y Neraida, they are not entitled to

87. 508 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 2007).
88. Id. at 589-90. Due to "scheduling conflicts," Mr. Afthinos was unable to accompany
Mr. Cienkowski to undertake the requested preparations of the yacht for the approaching
storm. Id. at 590.
89. Id. at 590. The sails were not removed due to the presence of heavy winds in the
area. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 591. In a separate action, the yacht owner sued for exoneration or limitation
of liability. Id.
92. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30505 (West 2007).
93. Fischer, 508 F.3d at 591-92.
94. Id. at 592.
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recover."'95 Under the burden-shifting rule developed in The Louisiana,96 The Oregon, and their progeny,98 a moving vessel that
strikes a stationary object is presumed to be at fault.9 9 An allision
defendant can rebut this presumption by affirmatively proving that (1)
the allision was the stationary object's fault, (2) the moving vessel acted
with reasonable care, or (3) the allision was inadvertent and unavoidable.' 0 0
The Eleventh Circuit initially noted that the district court had
correctly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, despite the
ambiguity of the one sentence cited by Fischer. 1" The Eleventh
Circuit then shifted its attention to the proper standard to apply to the
proof offered in support of a defendant vessel's argument that it had
acted with reasonable care.'0 2 Noting that "'[tihe highest degree of
caution that can be used is not required,"" 3 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that reasonable care in the context of hurricane preparations
amounts to "whether the owner 'use[d] all reasonable means and took
proper action to guard against, prevent or mitigate the dangers posed by
the hurricane."" 4 The Eleventh Circuit held that the record contained
substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding of the reasonableness of the vessel's efforts under the circumstances and affirmed the
district court's judgment in favor of the vessel. 10 5

95. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Fischer v. S/Y Neraida, No. 04-81131-CrVRYSKAM, 2005 WL 3991039, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2005)).
96. 70 U.S. 164 (1865).
97. 158 U.S. 186 (1895).
98. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair, Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 923 (11th Cir.
2001).
99. Fischer, 508 F.3d at 592 (citing Bunge Corp., 240 F.3d at 923).
100. Id. at 593 (citing Bunge Corp., 240 F.3d at 923).
101. Id. at 592-93.
102. Id. at 593.
103. Id. at 594 (brackets in original) (quoting The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. 196, 203
(1868)).
104. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Stuart Cay Marina v. MIV Special Delivery, 510
F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2007)).
105. Id. at 597.

